Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Israel by Michael Michaely
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development:
Israel





Chapter Title: Liberalization of Protective Restrictions: The 1960s
Chapter Author: Michael Michaely
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4558
Chapter pages in book: (p. 58 - 81)Chapter 3
Liberalizationof Protective
Restrictions: The 1960s
Inthis chapter I will deal primarily with the second stage of Phase IV which
falls in 1962—68, and which constitutes a distinct episode in the development
of Israel's policy of liberalization. This will be followed by a description of the
policy pursued during Phase V, beginning in 1969—a policy still too recent
for an analysis of its outcome; and by a summary of the liberalization process
in Israel.
1. THE POLICY PACKAGE OF 1962
By the late 1950s or early 1960s, we recall, the setting of quantitative restric-
tions had little to do with general balance-of-payments considerations; the
QRs were intended instead to serve as a protective device. Imports of raw
materials and intermediate goods were by that time mostly unrestricted. Im-
ports of final goods, on the other hand, particularly of consumer goods, were
prohibited whenever they were considered competitive with local production,
whether actually under way or merely contemplated.
In the absence of balance-of-payments considerations to stimulate or jus-
tify the OR system, much more attention started to be paid to its allocative
effects. This concern gathered momentum after the mid-1950s, and by the
early 1 960s most policymakers were convinced that the protection system led
to a substantial misallocation of the country's resources and would have to
undergo a radical transformation. This conviction resulted in another "New
Economic Policy"' (referred to officially as "the program for stabilizing the
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economy"), which was formally declared by Levi Eshkol, the then Minister
of Finance, on February 9, 1962. The policy consisted of eighteen separate
points, of which two constituted its backbone: formal devaluation and import
liberalization.
The devaluation of 67 per cent, from IL 1.80 to IL 3.00 per dollar, was
described as being intended both to help in adjusting the balance of payments
and to lead to a unification of the exchange-rate system by the abolition of
various other charges or subsidies. The liberalization was described in the fol-
lowing words: "The government will gradually lower the walls of overprotec-
tion of domestic industry against imports. In order to make manufacturing and
agriculture stand on the basis of cheap and efficient production, the govern-
ment intends to restrict the ceiling on rates of protective tariffs and to elimi-
nate the quantitative restrictions of imports. Local production will have there-
fore to compete with imported goods." 2
Thedevaluation itself, together with other price adjustments which ac-
companied it, was clearly used to lower the degree of diversification and dis-
crimination involved in the exchange-rate system. Indeed, it seems that this
was the purpose of the devaluation, at least as much as the effective increase
in the rate of exchange. While the formal increase in the foreign-exchange rate
was close to 67 per cent, the increase in the average effective rate of exchange
for exports (that is, in the reward per dollar of value added of exports) was
only about 13 per cent. The effective rate for imports increased more substan-
tially—by about 37 per cent—but was still considerably less than the increase
in the formal rate of exchange.
On the export side, the difference between the formal and effective rates
of devaluation was achieved by the abolition of most export subsidies. Since
the subsidies had been applied partly in a discriminatory fashion, their aboli-
tion resulted in greater uniformity of the effective-rate system in exports.
From the 1962 devaluation date until 1966, the effective rate of exchange
applied to most exports was roughly equal to the formal rate of IL 3.00 per
dollar. Even when export subsidies were reintroduced, in 1966, the system
remained much more uniform than it had been before the 1962 devaluation.8
In imports, the lower rate of increase of effective rates—compared with
the rate of formal devaluation—was due to the lowering of many tariff rates
(as well as the automatic decline of rates which were specific rather than ad
valorem—aithough this factor was not very significant in Israel). The result
of this adjustment of tariff rates was a considerable increase in the uniform-
ity of the exchange-rate system, similar to the development in exports—al-
though the import system remained much more heterogeneous and discrimina-
tory than that for exports. The coefficient of variation of effective rates for
imports went down from 0.435 in 1961 to 0.268 after the devaluation in


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0THE POLICY PACKAGE OF 1962 61
be seen in the Lorenz curves presented in Chart 3-1. The 1962 curve is ma-
terially closer to tJie diagonal than the curves applied to the three years pre-
ceding the devaluation—1959, 1960, and 1961 (in which the curves were
similar enough to be represented by a single curve). An interesting point is
that this pattern is quite contrary to the one observed for the preceding formal
devaluation (1952—54). As the Lorenz curves presented in Chart 3-1 show,
the earlier devaluation served to widen the dispersion of the rate system,
rather than to narrow it.
It is thus clear that changes in the price system—the devaluation itself
and the adjustment of tariffs and subsidies which accompanied it—led to-
ward greater uniformity in the exchange-rate system. These changes were not
relevant, however, to those imports which were effectively regulated not by
tariffs or other price components but by administrative quantitative controls.
That category was the object of the liberalization plan, which was the second
major policy step declared, the first being devaluation. But, here, it appears
that the government was not immediately prepared to state how the declared
policy would operate. It evidently had no clear idea of what steps it wanted
to take, what the time schedule would be for the introduction of liberaliza-
tion, or what mechanisms and processes should be involved. As soon as the
policy declaration was made, a considerable amount of interministerial nego-
tiations, and even bickering, started over these issues. Within a few months,
the following machinery was established.
Liberalization was to be governed by a "Public Commission," consisting
of representatives of several government ministries (primarily the Ministry
of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) and a few organiza-
tions (primarily the Histadrut and the Manufacturers Association). The com-
mission, which started its work in May 1962, was to discuss each good sepa-
rately on the basis of data and recommendations prepared by subcommittees.
The latter were to consist of government representatives only, and their work
was to be coordinated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The Public
Commission was not to initiate discussions, but to consider cases as they were
presented by the subcommittees (i.e., by the Ministry of Commerce and In-
dustry). No a-priori time schedule was set for these deliberations. The com-
mission would in each case make a decision on both the quantitative restric-
tion and the tariff level. With regard to the first aspect, the commission could
decide to lift restrictions, leave them intact, or leave them intact temporarily
pending further discussion on a predetermined date. The commission could
not mitigate the degree of severity of the restriction, that is, it had to make an
"all or nothing" decision, and could not go part of the way. However, the
commission was free to determine tariff levels as it saw fit. It could make a
once-and-for-all decision on the tariff level; or decide to reconsider the rate
within a specified period; or—as it did in a few rare cases—determine a priori
a scale of duties decreasing with time. All the commission's decisions were62 LIBERALIZATION OF PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS: THE 1960s
subjectto appeal before (jointly) the ministers of Finance and of Commerce
and Industry, a recourse which was used only rarely.
The machinery for the introduction of liberalization contained an obvi-
ous bias against the declared intention of the liberalization. It assigned a
prominent role to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry by giving its repre-
sentatives a leading position on the Public Commission, including its chair-
manship; by yielding only to the ministry the initiative for bringing items be-
fore the commission; and by leaving to the ministry the decisive function of
preparing all the material for the commission's deliberations. Given the fact
that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry stood rather openly against lib-
eralization (and even more emphatically against the devaluation), its promi-
nent position in the machinery must have been very relevant to the process.
Moreover, as has been mentioned, no time schedule was set for the introduc-
tion of liberalization. In addition, representatives of some of the bodies
which were bound to be damaged by each step of liberalization were given a
place on the commission and a voice in its deliberations. The machinery in
itself was thus not conducive to rapid liberalization.
Liberalization came to be interpreted, at that time, as a process consisting
of two stages. The first, which may be termed "nominal liberalization," was
a change in the form of protection rather than in its degree or structure: the
replacement of the OR system by a system of tariffs or other levies which
maintained imports at the same level as under the QR system. The second
stage was the reduction of the level of protection through the lowering of
tariffs imposed during the first stage of the process. The Public Commission
was implicitly or explicitly expected, at least by the Ministry of
and Industry, to handle the first stage only, and to carry out a primarily nomi-
nal liberalization.
The commission's work was for the most part completed by the end of
1966—more than four years after this mechanism of liberalization was put
in motion. During 1967 and 1968, a few more goods were liberalized. By
then, the process of conversion of the system from use of administrative con-
trols to protection by tariffs was supposed to have been concluded. Since then,
the second stage of lowering protective import duties has been carried out.
The following analysis relates only to the process during the nominal stage,
which was carried out by the Public Commission. Later in this chapter, the
lowering of duties following this stage will be surveyed.4
ii. GUIDiNG PRINCIPLES IN THE INTRODUCTION
OF LIBERALIZATION5
In the debate—mainly within the government—which preceded the establish-
ment of the Public Commission, a few principles for the introduction of lib-GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN THE INTRODUCTION OF LIBERALIZATION63
eralization were suggested. None of these, however, was formally adopted,
and the terms of reference of the commission did not specify any guiding
rules or principles for its work. However, the very structure of the mechanism
suggested some principles. Others became clear as the commission's work
started and progressed. The following is a summary account of the main prin-
ciples thus revealed.
First, the nature of the mechanism dictated a separate discussion of each
good. Thus, the commission was not supposed—nor did it try—to form any
general policy or policy rules. No efforts were made, for instance, to determine
any over-all protection level leading toward (or away from) uniformity of
tariff rates, and so on. It was not bound—and, as a rule, probably did n.ot
try—to consider each good within the general context of the economy. From
this basic fact, many of the other principles followed.
One guideline, quite often stated explicitly, was "efficiency rather than
elimination." That is, the commission's decisions about each industry were
supposed to lead to greater efficiency and cheaper production in the industry,
but not to its abolition. The commission's concern was thus with technical
efficiency, as expressed in the operation of each plant or industry, but not
with the economy's efficiency in allocating its resources. The major outcome
to which free (or freer) trade would have led thus could not be expected to
result from this process of liberalization.
From the rule on efficiency, there followed obviously one that tariffs
should not be uniform. This appeared both from the commission's decisions,
as will be demonstrated soon, and from explicit statements of the commis-
sion's members.° The commission appears to have adopted the following pro-
cedure in its work: it would try to establish the cost of production of the good,
on the assumption that production was handled in an "efficient" way, and
then determine a tariff level such that, given the local cost, domestic produc-
tion would be competitive with imports.7 Very often, when, the tariff level
thus required appeared to be extraordinarily high, the commission preferred
to leave the administrative prohibition intact rather than replace it by a tariff.
On the other hand, in accordance with the preceding principle, in no case
did the commission decide that local costs were so high as to justify the admis-
sion of imports with an accompanying substantial reduction or elimination
of the local industry.
Still another principle, less clear-cut, was that the level of protection de-
pended to some extent on the promised intentions of the industry (this was
relevant, of course, mainly when the industry consisted of a single firm).
"Good behavior" merited a higher level of protection. Such behavior could be
demonstrated in a variety of ways. One was the promise to lower local prices.
Another was the submission of plans, usually for technological modernization,
which were supposed to reduce the cost of production. A third was, quite
often, a plan—sometimes prepared on the initiative of the government—to64 LIBERALIZATIONOF PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS: THE 1960s
organizean industry that consisted of several firms into a cartel, on the
assumption that this would lead to greater efficiency and lower costs. In other
words, determination of the level of protection was often used by the govern-
ment as a tool to lead the industry to take steps which the government wanted
it to adopt.
Another prevalent rule was to tie the level of protection to some extent
to the level of exports. A high proportion of exports of the industry's output
presumably gave the industry a claim to enjoy a higher level of protection of
its domestic sales against imports.
Still another principle was the prevention of "unfair" competition by
TABLE 3-1
Number of References to Guiding Factors in Specific Liberalization Decisions,
by Industry, 1962—67













Meat, fish, oil, and
milk products 1 2
Other food 6 3 5
Textiles 3 6 2 9
Clothing 1 5
Wood and wood
products 2 1 2 4
Paper, cardboard, and
their products 1 1 3
Leather and leather
products 5 2 1 5
Rubber and plastic
products 5 9 10 1
Chemicals 3 10 12 8
Nonmetallic mineral
products 7 6 5 6
Metal products 2 2 2 1
Machinery 6 9 10 1
Electrical and electronic
equipment 4 5 2 6
Transport equipment 5 7 4 9
Total 44 64 54 65
SOURCE: Based on data compiled by Imry Toy from minutes of the Public Commission.THE EXTENT OF LIBERALIZATION 65
imports. This rule had a few variants. One of the best known concerned com-
pensation for the "good will" of imports; sometimes good will was understood
to reflect not just the reputation of a specific imported good but the general
"snob value" of imports. It was claimed that an inherently equal local good
was judged by the Israeli consumer to be inferior and would merit' extra pro-
tection to balance this factor. Another significant aspect of this rule was the
prevention of "dumping," either by retaining quantitative restrictions or by
determining a tariff which would compensate for the dumping element. Dump-
ing tended to be interpreted, i' this context, in a fairly broad fashion. Some-
times it even took the form of statements that comparisons of local costs with
foreign prices should not be made with the lowest-priced foreign imports, but
with some average price abroad (very often, a statement such as "it is good
enough if we can compete with European imports, and should not subject the
industry to competition with imports from a highly industrialized country like
the United States" was made and was accepted).
The major principles involved were not, as a rule, repeated in each of the
commission's discussions. On the other hand, the factors relating to good be-
havior and unfair competition, were usually mentioned specifically in the com-
mission's deliberations and decisions, when they were deemed relevant. The
extent of references to these factors is indicated by the data in Table 3-1
which is based on the commission's reports.
iii. THE EXTENT OF LIBERALIZATION
Liberalization was to have been introduced gradually but was to apply, once
the process was completed, to all imported items. One sector, however—agri-
culture—was left out of the process from the start. Since Israel at that time
could not have any trade relations with its neighboring countries, all fresh agri-
cultural produce, which made up much of the output of this sector, could not,
in any event, be subject to import competition within any relevant price range;
consequently the inclusion or exclusion of these goods could not be of much
significance. Another important segment of agriculture was of the opposite
variety: goods such as wheat, oil beans, animal fodder, and the like could not
be produced locally within the relevant price range (at least in the marginal
sense, i.e., where domestic production existed, it could not be increased sig-
nificantly). These were semiliberalized all along: their importation was mostly
handled by the government itself; but they were sold locally at something close
to the formal rate of exchange and no unsatisfied demand was left. However,
still other agricultural goods, such as milk products, sugar, or meat, were at
neither extreme, and for these, the issue of liberalization was definitely rele-
vant. After a heated debate on the issue, it was decided to exclude these goods66 LIBERALIZATIONOF PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS: THE 1960s
fromthe scope of the Public Commission. Indeed, to this day (1973), liberali-
zation has not been extended to these agricultural products. The process was
thus confined to manufactured goods—admittedly, a much more important
sector in its weight in the economy.8
TABLE 3-2
Extent of Liberalization, 1962—67
(Israeli pounds in millions)
Value of Product
Total Value of of Items Added to Col. 2 as
IndustrialLiberalization ListPer Cent of Cumulation
Producta During Year Col. 1 of Col. 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1962 IL 3,785 IL 183 4.8% 4.8%
1963 4,469 475 10.5 15.3
1964 5,262 406 7.7 23.0
1965 5,744 692 12.1 35.1
1966 5,767 331 5.7 40.8
1967 5,721 45 0.8 41.6
SOURCE: Data from Imry Toy, "Protection of Domestic Production in Israel, 1962—1967"
(M.A. diss., Hebrew University, 1971; in Hebrew).
a. Excluding diamonds.
Table 3-2 is an attempt to summarize the extent of liberalization; it re-
quires, however, a few words of explanation. Column 1 is derived from indus-
trial censuses but column 2 is based on estimates prepared for the discussions
of the Public Commission. Comparability and consistency of the two columns
are thus not ensured, although errors cannot be very large. It should also be
noted that, strictly speaking, a comparison of the two columns is meaningful
only if it is done for each year separately. On the other hand, a cumulative
series based on column 2, and its comparison with the size of product indi-
cated in column 1, is of very little significance, since both quantity and price
changes which took place from year to year in the product of "liberalized"
industries would be excluded. Column 3, on the other hand, can be made into
a cumulative series if it is assumed that the proportion of the product of each
good (or at least of the total of liberalized goods), in total manufacturing
production, remains unchanged. Where large aggregates are involved such an
assumption probably does not lead to grossly misleading estimates.
It appears from column 3 that most of the liberalization process took
place between 1963 and 1965, that is, from a year to four years after theTHE EXTENT OF LIBERALIZATION 67
declaration of the liberalization policy. By the end of the period, local produc-
tion in industries competing with liberalized imports amounted to roughly 40
per cent of the total value of the product of the manufacturing sector (exclud-
ing diamonds).
It thus seems that a very high proportion of domestic manufacturing—
probably over one-half—remained outside the liberalization process.9 Of
these, some had been liberalized before 1963; but the overwhelming majority
were still controlled, and thus remained free from import competition when
the liberalization process was supposedly completed. Among these nonliberal-
ized industries were the food processing industries classified in the censuses as
"manufacturing" rather than "agriculture." The latter sector, as was men-
tioned earlier, had been explicitly exempted from liberalization when the ma-
chinery was set into operation. Also included—again by explicit decision—
were all branches of the motor vehicles and motor parts industries. In numer-
ous cases, exemptions from liberalization were granted by ad hoc decisions,
owing to binding promises by the government to (usually foreign) investors
to give them complete protection from imports for specified (sometimes,
rather long) periods.'0 Other industries, estimated to have accounted for 10 to
15 per cent of total manufacturing production in 1967, were candidates for
liberalization by the yardsticks used but, in fact, remained subject to adminis-
.trative regulation (that is, usually, to import prohibition). Still another impor-
tant segment, amounting to roughly 20 per cent of total manufacturing, con-
sisted of industries which were labeled "irrelevant" for liberalization by the
government and which, therefore, were not presented at all before the Public
Commission.
The argument of irrelevance is open to doubt. There are obviously many
goods which, due to high transportation costs, may be deemed nontradable.
Examples often mentioned in the present context in Israel are industries such
as clay and sandstone or repair services provided by small shops. A decision
to liberalize imports of such goods would be immaterial—from the viewpoint
of the local industries involved. Since definitions of goods and industries are
usually quite broad, it is likely that in any "industry," some fraction would
face import competition within the revelant price range. If the intention of
policymakers was indeed to lead the economy toward liberalization,it
would be rational to declare such imports free, rather than leave them re-
stricted on the argument that the restriction is "irrelevant." It is therefore quite
possible that a fraction of the supposedly irrelevant sector is indeed relevant
and that these industries are effectively protected from import competition by
quantitative restrictions. There does not seem to be, however, any feasible way
of estimating the size of this fraction without undertaking an unduly large
amount of very detailed work.
Table 3-3 contains, first, data for 1962—68 on the value of actual im-68 LIBERALIZATION OF PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS: THE 1960s
TABLE 3-3
Imports of Goods Subject to Liberalization, by industry and in Relation
to Other Aggregates, 1962—68
(imports in millions of dollars)
Industry 1962196319641965196619671968
1. Food products 0.20.20.20.30.50.40.8
2. Textiles and textile products 8.56.86.76.1 7.18.911.6
3. Wood and wood products 0.10.30.50.4 1.9 1.3 1.9
4. Paper, cardboard, and their
products 0.50.50.60.35.76.812.0
5. Leather and leather products 0.60.51.2 1.42.22.1 2.7
6. Rubber and plastic products 1.6 1.31.61.8 1.6 1.8 1.9
7. Chemicals 1.81.00.91.72.82.92.8
8. Mineral products 1.10.8 1.0 1.5 2.1 1.8 1.6
9. Base metals and metal products 6.510.411.911.829.125.124.3
10. Machineryandelectricequipment8.913.720.221.728.828.739.5
11. Optical and scientific instruments0.50.60.60.80.90.70.8
12. Transport equipment 7.5 5.1 5.46.85.64.86.9
13. Miscellaneous manufactures 0.61.02.33.53.4 3.1 3.5
14. Total 38.442.253.158.191.788.4110.3
15. Ratio of line 14 to total imports
of goods (per cent) 6.06.36.37.010.911.39.8
16. Ratio of line 14 to value of indus-
trial product (per cent) 3.02.83.03.04.84.65.2
17. Annual increase in line 14 minus
rate of increase of GNP (per
cent) —2.311.5 1.152.5—5.013.6
SOURCE: Lines 1—13—Compiled from working papers of Imry Toy, based on Monthly
Foreign Trade Statistics, Central Bureau of Statistics.
Line 15—Total value of imported goods taken from Table A-10.
Line 16-—Total imports (line 14) converted to pounds at formal rate of IL 3.00 per dollar
for 1962—67; IL 3.50 per dollar in 1968. Value of industrial production, from Table 3-2,
column 1, projected to 1968 on the basis of the increase in the index of industrial production
in 1967 and 1968.
Line 17—Data converted to 1950 dollar prices using index of import prices, Table 6-5.
Rates of change of GNP in 1955 IL prices are from Table A-2.
ports of the liberalized items, by industry,1' and, in the bottom rows of the
table, the size of these imports in relation to other relevant economic aggre-
gates. By the yardstick of the quantitative impact of the liberalization on the
size of imports it appears from the table that, although liberalized imports
were not very substantial even by the end of the process, in 1968, the act of
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liberalization was probably not purely "nominal." The increase both in the
absolute size of liberalized imports and in their relation to the total imports
of goods, the value of industrial product, or the value of GNP took place
mainly in 1966; and imports remained on the higher level of that year in the
years following as well. It should be noted that, had the effective rate of ex-
change of these goods—almost twice the level of the formal rate, as will, be
seen shortly from the tariff data—been used in row 16, the size of liberalized
imports in 1966 compared to 1968 would appear to be close to 10 per cent of
the value of the local product against which these imports compete. This is not
a high figure; it is considerably lower than equivalent figures which represent
the weight of imports in the Israeli economy. But it does indicate that domestic
production, at least in large sectors, became exposed to some competition
from abroad.
iv. LIBERALIZATION AND THE DEGREE
OF PROTECTION
The tariff accompanying the removal of administrative prohibition was in-
tended to peg import prices at a level equal to local costs of production (or
perhaps slightly lower, so as to force an "efficiency" effort). At these import
prices—assuming the existence of equilibrium in the local market for each
good before liberalization—imports would be forthcoming not at all or only
in very small amounts, following the liberalization. To allow for the possibility
of miscalculations, it was understood—although this was not formally part of
the commission's should imports in a liberalized industry
reach a level of 10 per cent of sales of the local product, this would provide an
a-priori case for an appeal by the industry for revision of the commission's de-
cision concerning either the principle of removal of restrictions or the tariff
level fixed for the imported good.
Such a guiding principle would, of course, require the commission to
determine effective rates of protection. In its decisions, the commission natu-
rally imposed nominal tariffs on the final goods, rather than effective tariffs.
It also seems that a precise estimate of the level of the effective tariff implied
by any of the commission's decisions was not usually presented to the commis-
sion in its deliberations. From the minutes of the discussions of the commis-
sion it appears, however, that it did consider the level of effective protection.
The material prepared by the subcommittees for the commission's delibera-
tions always included an estimate of the ratio of value added in the total value
of the final product. Most often, it could be assumed that the import corn—
ponent was free, or almost free, of import duties. In this way, an approximate
idea of the level of the effective tariff implied by a given level of the nQminal70 LIBERALIZATION OF PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS: THE 1960s
tariff could be gained with little effort. At the same time, it. also seems clear
that the commission did not, as a rule, attempt to tailor a precisely appropriate
effective rate in each case. Rather, it worked within a few main broad cate-
gories of nominal tariffs, probably putting each good within that category
which would bring the effective rate closest to what the commission considered
to be appropriate.12
The rates of protection involved in the commission's decisions are pre-
sented in Table 3-4. A few of the findings may be highlighted:
First, the average level of the nominal tariff rates, which approached 80
per cent, is probably quite high in comparative terms. It is particularly high
in comparison with the average level of import tariffs in Israel at the time of
the introduction of liberalization. A simple calculation of averages would have
shown an increase of the general level of tariffs resulting from the act of lib-
eralization; but this, of course, would have little meaning, because tariffs
replaced quantitative restrictions.
The average level of effective tariffs is, naturally, above the average level
of the nominal rates—over 150 per cent. The reason is that imported inputs
in production are by and large free of tariffs. Since an import component of 50
per cent is quite common in Israel—most averages of import components of
large groups of commodities usually reach a figure of about this size—the
ratio of the two averages in Table 3-4 seems indeed very plausible. It may be
noted that for all individual goods, without exception, the effective tariff ex-
ceeds the nominal tariff,13 again because of the general absence of tariffs on
inputs. The highest ratio of effective to nominal tariffs presented in Table 3-4
is over 3.5(inthe clothing industry). Among individual goods, however,
rather than groups, as in Table 3-4, ratios in the range of 5 to 6 are not
uncommon.
The average level of effective protection indicated by these calculations
is rather high even in comparison with the existing general system of protec-
tion in Israel, although the figure of 150 per cent is "gross" rather than "net"
protection. Some of this protection serves to compensate for the low level of
the formal exchange rate, which was IL 300 per U.S. dollar until November
1967. The effective rate of exchange on value added in import substitutes as
derived from the average level of effective tariff rates was IL 7.6 per dollar.
This was much higher than any figure mentioned, within or outside the govern-
ment, as an equilibrium exchange rate during this period. The effective rate
for exports, to cite an important example, reached only about IL 3.50 per
dollar of value added toward the end of the period (that is, prior to the devalu-
ation of November 1967). Likewise, the general level of protection of import
substitutes was considerably lower, as will appear from the discussion in the
next chapter.
The averages involved are derived from arrays of rates containing aLIBERALIZATION AND THE DEGREE OF PROTECTION 71
TABLE 3-4
Means (M)andDispersions (aIM)ofNominal Tariff, Effective Tariff,




Tariff Tariff Ratio of
M Cal..1 to Pre-
M M (IL liberalization
(per (per per Nominal
cent)o-/Mcent) do!.)aiM Tariff
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4)(5) (6) (7)
Meat, fish, oil, and milk
products 72.81.107103.81.4696.10.750 1.10













Basic metals 39.10.49784.80.5615.50.256 2.68








SOURCE: Toy, "Protection," various tables.
a. Expressed in relation to value added; formal rate =IL3.00 per dollar.
sizable amount of dispersion. It may be more a matter of curiosity than of im-
portance to observe the maximum tariff rates involved in the commission's
decisions. These are presented, by main groups of commodities, in Table 3-5.
It appears that the nominal tariff rate was on occasion as high as 900 per cent;72 LIBERALIZATION OF PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS: THE 1960s
TABLE3-5














Meat, fish, oil, and milk products 540 982 33
Other food 290 634 22
Textiles 900 1,664 53
Clothing 900 4,000 124
Wood and wood products 138 499 18
Paper, cardboard, and their products 190 353 14
Leather and leather products 100 198 9
Rubber and plastic products 175 304 12
Chemicals 330 710 24
Nonmetallic mineral products 345 283 12
Basic metals 100 300 12
Metal products 220 400 15
Macliinery 83 178 8
Etectrical and electronic equipment 550 1,150 38
Transport equipment 177 828 28
Miscellaneous manufacturing 400 1,025 34
SOURCE: Toy, "Protection," Table 4. Data refer to decisions of the Public Commission
up to 1967.
a. Expressed in relation to value added; formal rate =IL3.00 per dollar.
and the effective rate, as much as 4,000 per cent! More interesting, perhaps, is
the distribution of nominal tariff rates by industry, which is presented in Table
3-6. There, it seems that nominal tariffs imposed by the commission were
concentrated largely (close to 40 per cent of the decisions, and over 50 per
cent when weighted by value added of the good) in the range of 60 to 89 per
cent. But the very high ratios of over 150 per cent were applied to as much
as 10 per cent of the goods. As might be expected, the distribution of effective
protection rates (not shown in the table) was more dispersed than that of
nominal rates.
The data in Table 3-4 also show a quite wide variation among averages of
tariff rates of main industrial groups. Nominal rates varied from 39 per cent
(for basic metal) to 133 per cent (for electrical equipment), whereas effective
rates ranged from about 75 per cent (paper and wood) to close to 400 per
cent (clothing). The average rates for industries would, of course, be of little
significance if each of them consisted of a variety of widely dispersed individ-
ual rates. Dispersion within each group was indeed quite substantial. Yet, withLIBERALIZATION AND THE DEGREE OF PROTECTION 73
TABLE 3-6
Frequency Distribution of Nominal Tariffs Imposed by Decision
of the Public Commission, by Indusfry, 1962—67
(number of decisions)
Nominal Tariff Rate
Industry Exempt 1—29 30—59 60—89 90—119
(percent)
120—149 150+Total
Meat, fish, oil, and
milk products 2 2 3 1 2 10
Other food 2 4 1 3 2 3 15
Textiles 9 10 12 6 2 11 50
Clothing 3 1 9 2 2 5 22
Wood and wood
products — 2 11 1 4 — 18
Paper, cardboard, and
their products 5 — 9 3 3 20
Leather and leather
products 1 1 11 5 2 — — 20
Rubber and plastic
products — — 7 20 3 2 3 35
Chemicals 2 4 36 15 2 3 62
Nonmetallic mineral
products 6 7 8 2 1 2 26
Basic metals 1 7 14 5 1 — — 28
Metal products — 11 23 43 6 2 3 88
Machinery 7 28 33 — — 68
Electrical and electronic
equipment — — 7 21 2 7 37
Transport equipment — 1 2 1 1 5
Miscellaneous
manufacturing 1 3 10 20 3 5 11 53
Total 5 60163217 37 21 54 557
Percentage distribution
of total .9 10.829.339.0 6.6 3.4 10.0100.0
Weighted by value
added of industry .2 7.522.251.1 6.7 2.1 10.2100.0
SOURCE:Tow,"Protection," Table 5; and compilations of other data assembled by Toy.
a few exceptions, the dispersion of rates within groups was considerably lower
than it was for all individual goods combined, as may be seen from columns 2
and 4 in Table 3-4. Two important exceptions are the clothing and electrical
equipment industries, where dispersion is particularly high. That is, the high74 LIBERALIZATION OF PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS: THE 1960s
averagetariff rates in these industries, which were mentioned before, reflect
not uniformly high rates within these industries but the impact of a few sub-
industries with particularly high rates.
From column 7 of Table 3-4, it appears that the nominal tariffs deter-
mined by the commission were mostly higher—sometimes substantially so—
than the preliberalization tariffs. This relation holds not just for averages of
groups of commodities, which are presented in the table, but also for the over-
whelming majority of individual goods. This phenomenon may be explained
by the fact that preliberalization tariffs, which accompanied the administrative
regulation (normally prohibition) of imports, were naturally not intended by
and large to provide protection nor, for that matter, to affect the local con-
sumer. They were imposed on a small amount of imports of each good, which
were allowed to enter by special provisions, such as those applying to the
transfer of capital by immigrants or by repatriating residents. These duties
were thus not normally prohibitive by themselves. Hence, the commission
usually found that a prohibitive tariff, in the absence of QRs, would have to
be higher.
Had we comparisons of pre- and postliberalization eflective protective
rates which incorporated the implied tariffs in the OR system, they would be
expected to show, if anything, the opposite difference. Effective rates could
not be higher than those implied by the OR system, unless the commission mis-
calculated or left a wide safety margin for protection, in which case the ex-
plicit tariff would partly consist of an irrelevant portion ("water"). On the
other hand, when liberalization is effective, the postliberalization effective rate
would be lower than the implied preliberalization rate; this would not be true
if an effectively liberalized good serves as an input in the production of an-
other liberalized good, but these instances are of very little practical impor-
tance. The fact that the liberalization did lead to some increase in imports, as
has been shown earlier, thus indicates a lowering, in many instances, of the
level of effective protection.
Data about effective protective rates before liberalization do not exist.
But the material presented before the Public Commission in its consideratidn
of each good contained estimates not only of the proportion of value added
in the good and its total size in the industry, but also of the price of the value
added, i.e., an estimate of domestic resource costs (DRCs) in the industry. A
comparison of this set with the figures for postliberalization effective protec-
tive rates derived from the very same source, that is, from the commission's
decisions on nominal rates and the value-added ratios presented to the commis-
sion, shows that by and large postliberalization effective rates were higher,
sometimes very much so, than the protection implied in the estimates of
DRCs. On the average, effective exchange rates implied in the commission's
decisions were about twice the estimated DRCs. This seems surprising, in viewTHE PROGRESSIVE LOWERING OF PROTECTION SINCE 1968 75
of the probable intention of the commission to afford each industry a level
of protection just sufficient for it to operate at the existing costs in the indus-
try. The discrepancy could have various explanations. One is simply that these
are miscalculations, but this would not be consistent with the fact that both
sets of calculations are derived from the same set of data as that which was
available to the commission. Another is that there was a desire to allow wide
safety margins; a corollary desire would be to provide margins not so much
for the present as for future stages, when tariff rates were expected to be
gradually lowered. Still another explanation is that the commission might have
considered marginal DRCs to be higher than the estimates of average DRCs
presented in the calculations, although this could certainly not account for the
two-for-one ratio. While all these are plausible explanations, the main reason
for the gap probably lies elsewhere, namely, in the unreliability of the esti-
mates of DRCs. It should be recalled that one of the main criteria guiding the
Public Commission's work was that of "efficiency": an industry "deserved"
protection if it was "efficient." A low estimate of DRC was generally accepted
as a proof of efficiency and of the profitability of an industry for the country's
economy. In presenting its data, an industry (as well as, very often, govern-
ment officials responsible for handling it) had a motive for showing a low
estimate of DRC. At the same time, it was very common for an industry to
demand an effective protective rate which far exceeded that low estimate. The
inconsistency was sometimes reconciled by claiming that the estimated DRC
reflected not actual costs, but a potentiality that would be realized shortly if
the industry were allowed to bloom under continuing protection. In many
other instances it was reconciled by the "good will" and "brand name"
argument; that is, the DRC estimate was attributed to the "true" value of the
local product which was the same as the value of the foreign product with
which the local product was being compared, and it was argued that the local
consumer unjustifiably discounted from this value in his own evaluation of the
two competing goods. In many other instances the inconsistency in the claims
was not explained at all, an oversight which was probably helped by the fact
that what was explicitly discussed and decided upon was not the effective, but
rather the nominal, tariff rate of the good.
v. THE PROGRESSIVE LOWERING
OF PROTECTION SINCE 1968
By 1969, what was defined as the first stage of the liberalization process—
the period of primarily nominal liberalization—was completed. Since that
time, quantitative restrictions have been lifted on imports of several goods
still subject to them in 1969. According to estimates of the Ministry of Corn-76 LIBERALIZATION OF PROTECTiVE RESTRiCTIONS: THE 1 960s
merce and Industry, imports competing with 92 per cent of industrial produc-
tion were liberalized by the end of 1969, and the ratio climbed to 95 per cent
by the end of 1972. These figures are probably biased upward; and agricul-
tural produce, we recall, remained subject to quantitative restrictions to a
greater extent than manufactures. Yet, itis quite safe to conclude that by
1969, quantitative restrictions were of only small over-all significance.
The stage of gradual lowering of the tariff protection afforded to the
"liberalized" sector started at the end of 1968, although a reduction of the
tariffs involved, by 10 per cent of the level of each tariff rate, had already
commenced in November 1966. This stage had been assumed all along to fol-
low the first stage of nominal liberalization. Its execution was apparently
helped by two factors. One was a change, in 1965, in the personalities and ap-
proach in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; the new ministers were
more disposed to liberalization. A more important factor was probably the
state of the economy. The recession years 1966 and 1967 were considered
an inappropriate time to expose domestic production to further competition
from abroad, whereas by the end of 1968, full employment had been restored.
In October 1968, a reduction of 15 per cent in the level of each tariff
took place. A few months later, in January 1969, a further reduction was
carried out, this time in a progressive manner. Tariff rates below 35percent
were left intact; rates between 35and50 per cent were lowered by 10 per
cent (of the tariff level); rates in the range from 51 to 75percent, by 15 per
cent; rates in the range from 76 to 100 per cent, by 20 per cent; and rates ex-
ceeding 100 per cent, by 30 per cent.
In August 1969, the government adopted an explicit program of lowering
of the protection afforded to liberalized industries, the main guideline of which
was the gradual approach toward a uniform "target" rate of effective protec-
tion. The target effective rate of foreign exchange for value added in import
substitution was set at IL 5.50 per dollar. Since the formal rate of exchange
was then IL 3.50 per dollar, the implied target rate of effective protection was
thus 57 per cent. The rate of IL 5.50 per dollar exceeded the effective rate of
foreign exchange for value added in exports in 1969 by about 35 per cent,
a figure quite close to the 25 per cent which was very often mentioned in
government circles, throughout the years, as the extra premium which import
substitution deserved. The target rate was scheduled to be reached by early
1975, through a tariff reduction in six equal installments in January of each
of the years 1970 to 1975. The "equal" installments referred to the levels of
effectiveprotection,which meant, of course, unequal annual reductions of
nominal tariffs. The levels of effective protection involved in the existing tariff
system are calculated, in the machinery specified in the 1969 decision, by
industry subcommittees of the Public Commission, although the full commis-
sion as such ceased to have a function in the process of liberalization; Prices ofTHE PROGRESSIVE LOWERING OF PROTECTION SINCE 1968 77
imports from Europe—but not necessarily from the potentially cheapest source
if it was outside Europe—are to be taken as "international" prices for the
calculations of effective protection rates. In addition, imports considered to be
sold at "dumping" prices are expected to be discriminated against by special
levies or by quantitative restrictions. Likewise, in cases where imports are
considered to have a "snob appeal," the target effective exchange rate is raised
by IL 0.5perdollar of value added. All these provisions resemble, of course,
the principles observed in the earlier deliberations of the Public Commission
in carrying out the process of nominal liberalization.
The first round of tariff reductions within this declared program occurred
in January 1970, when nominal tariffs were lowered by 5to15 per cent of the
tariff levels. In January 1971 a similar reduction took place, although it
applied only to a fraction of the imports concerned, since the act was intended
on that occasion to take into account tariff concessions made during 1970 in
connection with Israel's agreement with the European Economic Community.
This was true also for the third reduction (delayed from January to April of
1972), in which tariff rates were lowered by 5 to 18 per cent of the nominal
tariff level. Another tariff reduction, in the same degree, was undertaken two
months later, in June 1972. Following the formal devaluation of August
1971, in which the exchange rate was raised from IL 3.50 to IL 4.20 per
dollar, the target effective exchange.rate was raised by about the same pro-
portion—from IL 5.50 to IL 6.50 per dollar of value added; that is, the
implied effective protection rate came close to 55percent—about the same
level as before the devaluation.14 In January 1973, tariffs were lowered so as to
result in a reduction of the excess of the effective exchange rate for value
added over the new target rate by 35 per cent. Finally, effective May 1973 but
promulgated in February 1973, tariffs were further lowered across the board
by 15 per cent of the nominal tariff (or 10 per cent of the specific
tariffs).
Since the tariff reductions have been made on changing bases, it is im-
possible to compute the total reduction by simply adding up the whole
sequence of individual reductions; an estimate of the total reduction would
require careful research, which has not yet been carried out, because most
of the tariff reductions are of very recent vintages. As a guess it may be as-
sumed, on the basis of the quantitative description here, that since the end of
1966, and primarily since late 1968, effective protective rates have been low-
ered by over half of their excess in 1966 or 1968 over the implied target
It may be assumed that some, perhaps many, tariff rates had "water"
in them; so reductions of these tariffs within a given range had no impact. Yet,
the tariff reductions undertaken thus far within this stage of the liberalization
process seem impressive and significant in lowering the average level and the
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tive restrictions. Likewise, it appears that the declared policy of 1969 has been
carried out approximately as scheduled; it may thus be expected that by 1975,
the major fraction of the element of discrimination in the system of protection
of liberalized industries will have disappeared.
An element which may be working in the opposite direction should, how-
ever, be noted at this point. Since 1968, military purchases of locally produced
industrial goods have grown very substantially; although their size has not
been disclosed, there is no doubt that they constitute a significant proportion
of the country's industrial output. As will be pointed out in the next chapter,
purchases of military imports have always been made at a low rate of ex-
change. Usually, this has meant the formal rate; that is, military imports have
been free of duty; but since August 1971, they have been subject to the gen-
eral import levy of 20 per cent which was imposed a year earlier. Details of
the purchasing policy for military goods are not publicly known. It seems that
purchasing agencies are generally instructed to buy from the cheapest source.
If such a policy is carried out universally, it would mean that the relevant
local industrial sector faces competition from imports at a low effective rate of
exchange which includes no tariff duties beyond the general 20 per cent levy.
It is believed, however, that the purchasing agencies are allowed to deviate
from the "lowest-cost" principle when they see a reason for preferring to
maintain local production of a specific military good, and that they have a
wide discretion in interpreting this rule. It is thus possible that some military
purchases of local goods are made at prices which imply high rates of effec-
tive protection—although, again, not much evidence is available on this
point. To the extent that this phenomenon is widespread, the expansion of
domestic military purchases serves to raise the level (and dispersion) of effec-
tive protection.
vi. GENERAL REMARKS ON THE PROCESS
OF LIBERALIZATION
Severe quantitative restrictions on imports were imposed in Israel in the late
1940s and early 1950s, due to very intensive pressures on the balance of pay-
ments. The progressive devaluation of 1952—54, which was part of the shift
to the use of the price mechanism, relieved most of these pressures. The
absence of a general balance-of-payments motivation for quantitative restric-
tions since the mid-1950s led, indeed, to a rapid liberalization of most of the
country's imports, including a large majority of the imports of raw materials
and most imports of investment goods. These became effectively free of mean-
ingful restrictions within a short span of years.
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potential local production, mainly imports of finished or semifinished manu-
factures of consumer goods, none of which were liberalized during the 1950s
or early 1960s. Only in 1962 was a policy of liberalization of such imports
declared. And even then, it appears that the actual execution of this policy will
have taken close to fifteen years. Of these, some seven years—from early
1962 to late 1968—were required for the first stage, which was primarily a
nominal liberalization consisting of a switch from QRs to equal protection
by tariffs; and seven or eight more years—from late 1968 to, as it seems now,
1975 or 1976—for the effective abolition of this protection or its drastic
reduction. In general, if the rest of the liberalization process is carried out
roughly on schedule, competitive imports will be effectively liberalized—not
just in the sense of switching from one form of protection to another, but in
the sense of removing entirely the protection originally afforded by the QRs
—more than twenty years after the original balance-of-payments motivation
for the QR system has disappeared.
The stage of nominal liberalization of competitive imports carried out
between 1962 and 1968 was certainly much longer than was either necessary
for technical reasons or anticipated at its inception. Indeed, when the liberali-
zation policy was declared, in February 1962, such a stage was not contem-
plated. There is also no logical reason why an effective liberalization should
necessarily consist of two stages—a nominal stage and a stage of tariff reduc-
tion. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that the period of nominal liberaliza-
tion was a complete waste.
First, despite the general lack of effectiveness, in several instances lib-
eralization was effective rather than purely nominal: it led to lower protection,
an increase of imports, and probably some reallocation of domestic resources.
Much more important, however—and less easily measured—was the
effect on new industrial ventures. Even though protection of established enter-
prises remained mostly intact, it was no longer the general practice to afford
protection by total import prohibition to any investment in a new industrial
enterprise. Since the introduction of liberalization, protection had to be af-
forded mainly by the imposition of tariff duties; and such protection very often
could not be as high as that which would have been obtained by total import
prohibition.
This points to another favorable aspect of the liberalization, one which,
again, is not subject to measurement but is probably of considerable impor-
tance. Nominal liberalization, achieved by limiting imports by levying tariffs
rather than by administrative regulation, makes explicit the price involved in
the protection. This helps to strengthen public resistance to the granting of
protection. It probably results in setting some ceilings to the protection af-
forded to new industries and contributes to stronger pressures for the lowering
of existing protective rates.80 LIBERALIZATION OF PROTECTIVE RESTRICTIONS: THE 1960s
Thus,while there is indeed no logical need for an effective liberalization
to be implemented in this way, rather than by a single act, the gradual ap-
proach taken may prove to be a more feasible process, owing, partly to the
benefits of making protective rates explicit. When these rates are known, it
may be easier to estimate the effect on each industry of reducing or eventually
eliminating tariffs. This also facilitates the gradual introduction of import
competition; and it is hard to expect any import liberalization of goods whose
local production has been sheltered all along to be implemented in any but a
gradual fashion.
If any more general lesson can be learned from the Israeli experience, it
is that once an economy has been subject to exchange control and import pro-
hibitions for a long period, and its whole industrial structure has been deter-
mined accordingly, it is very difficult to introduce changes which open the
economy to import competition. As long as liberalization raises effective pro-
tective rates, as liberalization of imports of raw materials most often does, it
may be easy to implement. But an effective liberalization of finished or semi-
finished manufactured goods, which generally lowers effective protection,
faces strong objections from a sizable fraction of the economy's industries.
Even if governments were entirely free to act, such liberalization would have
to be introduced only gradually, owing to the quite high costs involved in the
short run in the transition from one industrial structure to another.
NOTES
1. Often referred to in Israel as the "Second New Economic Policy," to distinguish
it from the policy act of February 1952.
2. From the text of the policy declaration of the Minister of Finance on February 9,.
1962.
3. The development of the system of export premiums will be described in the
next chapter. It will be noted there that even before the 1962 devaluation, the variance
of effective exchange rates was much smaller in exports than in imports. Substantial
movements toward uniformity of the effective rates of exchange and rates of protection
could thus emerge primarily from changes on the import side.
4. As will be mentioned, some lowering of tariffs also took place between 1966 and
1968, while the transformation of the "nominal" stage was still under way. These tariff
changes are abstracted from in the following quantitative analysis.
5. The discussion in this section and the next two draws to some extent on Haim
Barkai and Michael Michaely, "More on the New Economic Policy" (in Hebrew), Rivon
Le'Kalkala [Economic quarterly] 39 (August 1963): 2—24; and more substantially, on
Imry Toy, "Protection of Domestic Production inIsrael,1962—1967" (M.A. diss.,
Hebrew University, 1971; in Hebrew). Most of the dissertation was published in Nadav
Halevi and Michael Michaely, eds., Studies in Israel's Foreign Trade (Jerusalem: Falk
Institute and Hebrew University, 1972; in Hebrew), pp. 129—173. Part of the study
appeared in Toy, "Import Liberalization Policy in Israel, 1962—1967" (in English),
Bank of Israel EconomicReview37 (March 1971): 28—51.NOTES 81
6.A typical quotation: "To open trade in all goods at a uniform tariff would be the
utmost absurdity. It must be realized that one industrial branch or industrial good is
never like the other" [A. Dovrat (director of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's
Industrial Division), Symposium on Problems of Domestic Protection (Jerusalem: n.p.,
1963; in Hebrew), p. 2].
7. A similar working rule, in the operation of the Indian tariff commissions in the
l950s, has been noted by Padma Desai, Tariff Protection and industrialization: A Study
of the indian Tariff Commission at Work, 1946—1965 (Delhi: Hindustan, 1970).
8. It will be recalled that by 1970, the share of manufacturing in the national prod.
uct was about 26 per cent versus 6 per cent for agriculture; the corresponding shares of
the two sectors in employment were 26 and 9 per cent.
9. As was mentioned earlier, some goods were liberalized during 1968, while Table
3.2 only covers the period up to the end of 1967; but these cases were very few.
10. Such promises very often also included the commitment to assure the investor
a completely monopolistic position by preventing the local establishment of any com-
peting plant during the specified period.
11. To be precise, these are annual imports of 1,029 items which had been liberal-
ized by 1968; in each of the preceding years, some of these items were not yet liberalized.
The table thus shows both the effect of additions to the list of goods liberalized in each
year and the cumulative effect of liberalization in earlier years.
12. Since the mid-1950s, protection has generally been discussed by industry, gov-
ernment, or academic economists in Israel in terms of effective rather than nominal tariff
rates.
13. This difference does not appear in Table 3-4, which is confined to categories
rather than to individual goods.
14. After the 1971 devaluation the average effective exchange rate for value added
in exports was about IL 5.20 per dollar. The target rate in imports thus exceeds the
current export rate by 25 per cent, instead of the 35 per cent found in the comparison
for 1969.
15. If we make the reasonable assumption that the target effective exchange rate of
IL 6.50 per dollar of value added is roughly the same as the present equilibrium ex-
change rate, then the implied target "net" effective rate of protection would be zero. See
the discussion in the next chapter.